In poor countries, total factor productivity (TFP) is particularly low in sectors producing tradable goods, and relative prices of tradables are high. We document that an important di¤erence between tradable and non-tradable sectors is their average establishment size: tradable establishments operate at much larger scales. We develop a model co-determining TFP, relative prices and scales across industrial sectors. In our model, …nancial frictions disproportionately a¤ect TFP in tradable sectors where production requires large setup costs. Our quantitative exercises show that …nancial frictions explain 50% of the observed cross-country patterns of TFP, relative prices and relative scales across sectors.
Introduction
Income per capita di¤erences across countries are mainly accounted for by lower TFP in poor countries (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997, Hall and Jones, 1999) . More disaggregated data show that the TFP gap between rich and poor countries di¤ers systematically across sectors in the economy: Poor countries are particularly unproductive in producing tradables. 1 Since equipment is tradable, low relative productivity in tradables increases the relative price of equipment in poor countries and limits capital accumulation in poor countries. 2 Thus, an important task in development economics is to understand the causes of such sectoral di¤erences in TFP.
In this paper, we propose and quantify a theory of sectoral productivity di¤erences based on sectoral di¤erences in optimal scale of establishments, and on cross-country di¤erences in …nancial developments.
We start from the observation that the size of a typical establishment, measured by 1 Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) are the classic citations for tradables and non tradables. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2007a) are more recent contributions. 2 See again, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , Eaton and Kortum (2001) , and Jones (1994).
2 workers per establishment, re ‡ects the technological di¤erences across industrial sectors.
Using detailed sectoral data, we document that the average establishment in the tradable sector is three times larger than that in the non-tradable sector. Furthermore, using price data for a cross section of countries, we show that at a disaggregate level, poor countries are relatively unproductive in industries with larger scales.
These observations lead us to study models that imply sectoral scale di¤erences, and to explore how …nancial frictions distort scales of operation in di¤erent sectors.
We model production in which entrepreneurs face a one-time setup cost to start an establishment. Entrepreneurs have a limited span of control, and establishments operate diminishing-returns technologies. Sectors di¤er in their setup costs, and hence their pro…t-maximizing scale: Tradable sectors have large setup cost, and hence operate at large scale.
Agents choose sectors and occupations. In a frictionless economy, the most able individuals become entrepreneurs and the marginal products of capital is equalized across sectors and establishments. With …nancial frictions-which we model with endogenous enforcement constraints-entrepreneurs'investment decisions are constrained by their available wealth.
The decisions of whether to become an entrepreneur, in which sector, and how much capital to invest are driven not only by ability but also wealth. Tighter …nancial frictions hurt productivity, and disproportionately so in the large-scale tradable sector.
Credit market imperfections are a natural candidate for distortions disproportionately a¤ecting large-scale sectors. A central role of credit markets is precisely to provide the …nancing that is critical for the viability of large-scale ventures with signi…cant setup costs.
Indeed, it has been widely recognized that well-functioning credit markets are an important institution missing from poor economies 3 , and a large theoretical literature has considered the role of credit markets in economic development.
Our quantitative exercises show that …nancial frictions help explain the observed patterns 3 The literature here is vast. Banerjee and Du ‡o (2005) provide an excellent review. Banerjee and Du ‡o (2004) and Kaboski and Townsend (2007) provide model-based, quasi-experimental evidence of credit constraints. Townsend (forthcoming) gives an in depth case study of Thailand. 3 in relative TFP and relative prices of tradable (large scale) v. non-tradable (small-scale) goods. The model explains roughly half of the relative price and income relationship. In addition, …nancial frictions lower overall output and wages. At the same time, they increase the number of establishments in the small-scale sector, and decrease that in the large-scale sector, because of selection of low wealth individuals away from the high scale sector, and also away from being workers. Finally, the relative size of establishments in the large-scale sector increases with the degree of …nancial frictions, and we present suggestive evidence in favor of this testable implication.
The paper is most closely related and complementary to two others in the literature that emphasize the di¤erential e¤ects of …nancial frictions on manufacturing industries. 4 Rajan
and Zingales (1998), an empirical paper, creates an index of dependence on external sources of …nancing for each industry and test whether industries that are particularly dependent on …nancing grow relatively faster in countries with strong …nancial systems. Erosa and Hidalgo (forthcoming) is a theoretical paper showing how …nancial frictions have di¤erential e¤ects on productivity in manufacturing industries with di¤erent …xed cost requirements.
Our paper di¤ers from these in three ways. First, our analysis explicitly combines data and theory by quantifying the e¤ect of …nancial development on sectoral productivity. Second, we introduce scale as an empirical measure related to setup costs and …nancing. Finally, we broaden the analysis to encompass the tradable and non-tradable sectors, and emphasize their scale di¤erences. 
Relative Productivity and Development
The Balassa-Samuelson fact is that, in poor countries, the prices of tradables are high relative to those of non-tradables. Figure 1 con…rms this fact for the 1996 ICP benchmark by plotting the relative price of tradables against real output per worker from the Penn World Tables 6.2.   5 Here the relative price is produced by creating Geary-Khamis aggregated prices for tradables and nontradables sectors using 27 disaggregated product categories. 6 The relative price of tradables has a strong negative relationship with log output per worker. The regression elasticity of -0.37 is highly signi…cant at the one percent level, and the relationship has an
This relationship can be interpreted as re ‡ecting a lower total factor productivity in tradables relative to non-tradables in poor countries. Indeed, in models with constant returns to scale aggregate production functions, and equal factor shares across sectors, these relative prices equal the inverse of relative TFP. 7 Di¤erences in factor shares and the relative supply 5 There are 115 ICP benchmark countries in 1996. For the sake of maintaining a consistent sample, we present results based on the 102 countries for which we have data on …nancial development from Beck et al (2000) . The results using all 115 countries are virtually identical. 6 The tradable categories consist of clothing, 9 food and beverage categories, footwear, fuel, furniture/ ‡oor coverings, household appliances, household textiles and other household goods, machinery/equipment, tobacco, and transportation equipment. The non-tradables consist of communication, construction, education, medical/health, recreation/culture, rent and water, restaurants/hotels, and transportation services. We do not classify four …nal goods price categories: "changes in stocks", "collective consumption by government", "net foreign balance", and "other goods and services". if anything, the non-tradable sector tends to be intensive in human and physical capital. 8 Explaining the source of this relative TFP vs. output per worker relationship is the goal of the paper.
Relative Productivity and Financial Development
Financial development is a potential suspect for explaining cross-country di¤erences in relative productivity. A common measure of a country's level of …nancial development is its ratio of external …nancing (private credit+private bond market capitalization+stock market capitalization) to GDP (LaPorta et al, 1998, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Figure 2 presents the ICP data of log relative prices vs. the ratio of external …nancing to GDP taken from Beck et al (2000) . The relationship is quite similar with a slightly lower estimated elasticity of 0.32, but a slightly higher R 2 of 0.42.
Given the similarities between the relationships, a priori …nancial development has potenbetween capital and labor and sectoral TFP di¤erences. 8 tial to explain the Balassa-Samuelson fact. In the theory, we present …nancial development will be the causal force, however. A simple joint regression of log relative prices on both log GDP/worker and log external …nancing/GDP gives suggestive evidence. In this joint regression, the elasticity with respect to external …nancing (0.23) is 50 percent higher than the coe¢ cient with respect to output per worker (0.16) with a substantially smaller standard error. 9 classi…cation. 12 We present unweighted averages, the measure of interest implied by implied 9 Measurement error in either output per worker or …nancial development could confound these estimates, to the extent that one is a mismeasured proxy for the other. 10 The di¤erent data sources also include two di¤erent measures of workers: number of employees and total number of persons engaged. The major di¤erence is that the latter includes proprietors, while the former may includes some types of temporary or contract workers. For some countries, we have both measures, and the two mirror eachother well. 11 These sectors are constructed to re ‡ect …nal goods categories covered in the ICP data. Manufacturing consumption includes food, beverages, textiles, clothing, medicine, furniture, appliances, TVs and radios, cars, household items, and media. Equipment includes all manufactured equipment not included in consumption. Together, these two encompass tradables. Services includes accomodation/food services, arts/entertainment, communication, education, FIRE, health, retail, sewage, transportation, and wholesale. 12 There are also subtle di¤erences in de…nitions of workers across the two samples. In particular, the SSIS by the model we present, but worker-weighted averages show similar patterns. Whether establishment or enterprise is used as the unit of measure, average scale varies considerably across these broad sectors of the U.S. economy. The top breaks out scale by disaggregated sectors: manufactured consumption, services, equipment investment, and construction. Manufactured consumption and equipment investment tend to be large scale, while services and construction are smaller scale. This distinction is precisely the tradable vs.
Scale Di¤erences Across Sectors
non-tradable distinction in the two rows below. 14 Hence, the tradable sector is substantially larger scale than the non-tradable sector. In the SSIS data for workers per establishment, the tradable sector is over 3.5 times as large (43 vs. 12). The ratio of tradable scale to nontradable scale is smaller using enterprise as the unit, but still over 3 (48 vs. 15). Finally, the U.S. census establishment data, yields larger numbers for scale, but the ratio is still above 3
(again 48 vs. 15). 15 data measures "number of persons engaged", which includes proprietors. The census data is "number of employees" and excludes proprietors. 13 The averages are unweighted averages across 4-digit industries (OECD SSIS data) and 8-digit industries in the U.S. census data. One source of the larger values for the U.S. census data come from the fact that air transportation and rail transportation have been dropped from the SSIS data to assist cross-country comparison. 14 We lack comparable scale data for agriculture, a third component of tradables. In advanced economies, land/capital investments per farm are substantial, but workers/farm may not be large. 15 Buera and Kaboski (2007b) build on the related scale distinction between manufacturing and services.
In the model we develop in the next section, di¤erences in scale will be driven by di¤er-ences in set-up costs across sectors. We view these costs as the costs of setting up and learning to operate a particular technology. Given this interpretation, establishment is our preferred unit of reference because we think it more often re ‡ects the technology of production, but for some technologies (e.g., Walmart), these costs may be at the …rm level.
Relative Prices and Scale
In the United States, where capital markets are relatively well-functioning, we view the observed scale of technologies as closely mirroring the optimal scales of di¤erent technologies. 16 A natural question to ask is how the relative prices relate to the scale of technologies. We ran cross-country regressions of the prices of disaggregated ICP price data (relative to country PPP) on log output per worker for each category:
where p i;s is the 1996 price of sector s in country i, P P P i is the 1996 PPP price level of country i, and real GDP/WOK i is the output per worker in 1996 international prices.
Categories with highly negative coe¢ cients are categories whose relative prices fall markedly with output per capita (as with the tradable sector). We then mapped these disaggregated ICP categories into measures of scale using the U.S. Economic Census data. Why might poor countries be particularly unproductive in operating technologies with large optimal scales? Again, to the extent that scale re ‡ects large set-up costs, we view scale as being related to …nancial dependence. 18 A …nal fact, which has been well-documented in other existing papers, is that poor countries tend to have lower levels of …nancial intermediation and lower levels of investor protection (see King and Levine, 1993 , and LaPorta et al,1998). The next section develops a model to potentially explain these patterns based on poor countries having tighter credit constraints.
Model
We model an economy with two sectors, s = N T (small-scale, non-tradable sector),T (large-scale, tradable sector); and, in each sector, two occupations (worker and entrepreneur/manager). The economy is open and takes the price of tradables as …xed; in the end, 18 Indeed, our model is based on a di¤erent measure of …nancial dependence than Ranjan and Zingales (1998), since the set up cost in our model measures absolute need, while they measure the fraction of investment that is externally …nanced. The two are nonetheless related; for the manufacturing industries they consider, log average workers/establishment is positively related to their …nancial dependence index for young …rms, and mildly signi…cant at the 6 percent level.
with only one tradable good, openness will simply set the price of the tradable output. There is a continuum of dynasties. At the beginning of a "generation", dynasties only di¤er in terms of their wealth (a). At that time, individuals make an irreversible decision to specialize in a particular sector. After choosing a sector, they draw a sector-speci…c entrepreneurial idea z from the distribution (z). Agents then decide whether to work for a wage or start a business in their sector. Entrepreneurial ideas die with probability 1 , in which case, a new "generation" within a dynasty again gets to choose sectors and draw a new entrepreneurial ability. 19 
Preferences
Dynasties preferences are described by the following expected utility function over sequences of pairs of sectoral consumption c t = (c N T;t ; c T;t ),
The expectation is over the realization of the draw of entrepreneurial ideas (z) and the death of these ideas.
Occupational Choice and Technology
Individuals from a new generation starting with wealth a must …rst decide the sector in which to specialize. This assumption captures, in a very simpli…ed way, the fact that individuals obtain sector-speci…c skills early in their careers that may allow them to manage a technology (Chari and Hopenhayn, 1993). 20 To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we collapse this initial training period into an in…nitesimal moment.
After drawing the sector-speci…c productivity z associated with their entrepreneurial idea, individuals choose whether to work for a wage or start a business in sector s. If they choose to work for a wage, they can do it in either of the sectors. This assumption guarantees that there is a single labor market with wage w.
Alternatively, agents can start a business in the sector where they specialized. To start a business, they must pay a …xed setup cost of s units of the sector's output. The crucial assumption is that T > N T . After paying the setup cost, they produce using capital (k) and labor (l) according to the following production function:
Per-period pro…ts of an entrepreneur operating in sector s are:
(k; l; r; w) = p s zk l Rk wl
The value of being a worker v w (a; z; s) depends on an agent's assets a, but also the productivity z and sector s of an agent's idea which may be implemented at a later date. The value of being an entrepreneur v e (a; z; s; b) depends on these as well, but also on b 2 f0; 1g, an indicator of whether or not the business has already been started by paying the set-up cost. Thus, the state vector of individual's problem is described by a quadruple (a; z; s; b).The value of an agent facing the choice between working an entrepreneurship is then:
v (a; z; s; b) = max fv w (a; z; s) ; v e (a; z; s; b)g
The value of a new generation facing the choice of specializing in a sector depends only these lines, and evidence of this mechanism from the rigid disk-drive industry.
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on assets:
Credit and Rental Markets
Individuals have access to competitive credit and rental markets. Financial intermediaries receive deposits, accumulate and rent capital at a rental rate R, and lend to entrepreneurs.
Borrowing is between period, while capital rental is within period.
We assume that, while assets are transferred across generations, debts do not carry over to future generations. 21 Hence, the probability of death introduces a wedge between the deposit (r d ) and borrowing rates (r b ). Free entry and, therefore, zero pro…ts for …nancial intermediaries imply:
where is the depreciation rate.
Both borrowing and the rental of capital by entrepreneurs are limited due to enforcement problems. The enforcement problem is characterized by the following limited enforcement constraint:
where a The left-hand side represents the value of complying with the contract, and the right- 21 One can view this as re ‡ecting either limited liability for …rms or a prohibition on debts being transfered from parents to children, which is customary in modern societies.
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hand side represents the value of reneging on rental and debt obligations. This latter value is a function of the constants , capturing the severity of the punishment associated with default as measured by the exclusion from credit and business opportunities ( ), and the fraction of the borrowed money that can be steel by borrowers upon defautl ( ).
To focus on the production role of credit markets, we abstract from borrowing by workers and require that they have a positive net-worth.
Recursive Representation of Agent' s Problem
We are ready to state the Bellman equations that de…ne the value functions of workers and entrepreneurs, v w (a; z; s) and v e (a; z; s; b).
The problem of an individual that works for a wage in the current period solves: 
s:t:
wherer = r d (a 0) + r b (a < 0). Again, the tradable goods sector, which produces invest-ment goods, is the numeraire, so that p fp 1 ; 1g.
Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibria given by an invariant distribution of wealth, entrepre- 
First Best Benchmark
To clarify the basic mechanics of the model it is instructive to analyze the undistorted …rst best allocation. This is also the benchmark economy that we use to calibrate the technological parameters of the model, by matching key aspects of the size distribution of establishments in the US economy.
In writing this problem, we start by solving for the optimal allocation of capital and labor within sector s for a given fraction of the population specializing in the sector, n s , a given threshold idea productivity for starting a business,ẑ s , and a given amount of capital 16 and labor in the sector K s and L s :
whose solution is the (gross) sectoral production function for a given distribution of …rms de…ned by n s andẑ s :
Realizing that n N T = 1 n T , the Bellman equation characterizing the …rst best allocation can be written:
We next present two results characterizing the …rst best allocation for the case in which we assume ideas follow a Pareto distribution, z z m z ( +1) . This assumption yields closed form solutions for the net sectoral production function, i.e., the output of a given sector net of the resources used to setup plants, the factor shares, and the size distribution of 23 To simplify the exposition we abstract from the irreversibility in the sectoral choice decision, i.e., the constraint n 1 n 
ps s w
(1 )
From this result it follows that, as in the standard neoclasical sectoral growth model, the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor are constant, + +1= and + +1= ;
respectively. Unlike in the standard model, however, the elasticities are not equal to the corresponding factor shares, since entrepreneurs earn rents. In particular, payments to capital as a share of income equals:
Even though factor shares are not constant, for realistic parametrization of the model 1 1 0, implying that factor shares are constant for practical purposes.
We …nish this section by studying the size distribution of establishments in the …rst best economy. In particular, we show that, within a sector, establishments are distributed Pareto with tail coe¢ cient (1 ), while the size distribution over the entire economy is given by a mixture of Pareto distributions. We also show that there is a one-to-one mapping between the value of the setup cost relative to the labor cost p s s =w and the ratio of the average employment per establishment l s across sectors.
Proposition 2
The distribution of employment in each sector follows a power law:
where l (ẑ s ) is the employment in the marginal establishment; while the distribution of employment in the aggregate economy is given by a mixture of Pareto distributions:
; and the ratio of average employment per establishment across sectors equals:
This result suggests a simple way to calibrate the relative importance of setup cost across sectors and the parameter of the distribution of ideas by matching the ratio of average employment per establishment across sectors and the tail of the size distribution of establishments. In the next section, we use this insight to calibrate the model, and then study how credit frictions a¤ect the relative productivity across sectors, and the size distribution of establishments.
Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate the perfect credit benchmark to the United States economy.
We then conduct experiments varying only , the parameter which captures the extent of …nancial frictions, to obtain variation in debt/GDP ratios that are quantitatively reasonable given the range observed in the cross-section of countries. We assess the model's predictions for TFP, prices, output and scale across sectors. Finally, we assess a testable implication of the model about variation in the relative scale of sectors vis-a-vis the data.
Calibration
We calibrate the preferences and technological parameters so that the …rst best economy matches standard macroeconomic aggregates and key features of the size distribution of establishments across sectors in the U.S.
We choose a degree of returns to scale to the variable factors, capital and labor, of A period in the model is set to 2 years, and we let = 0.93 so that the average duration of working lives is 30 years. Calibrating to the working life, which is longer than the life of the typical establishment, is conservative in the sense that entry costs will be a smaller fraction of total output. The 2-year depreciation rate is set at = 0:11 and set = 0:9 to match the 2-year interest rate. We let = 1:5 following the standard practice. The assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables is consistent with Figure 3 shows the size distribution of establishment implied by the calibrated model, and compares them with their data counterparts. The model is able to …t the tails of these distribution, the "distance" between the sectoral distributions, and the initial concavity in the aggregate distribution of establishments. The model cannot capture the initial concavity in distribution of establishment within a sector, presumably due to our abstracting from within-sector heterogeneity in the setup costs. Table 3 gives a summary of our empirical targets in the cross-country data. Here we have divided the sample into quintiles by output per worker, and listed the statistics regarding We compare these empirical results to our numerical examples. We show numerical examples for two levels of …nancial frictions as well as the …rst best benchmark. The case of mild …nancial frictions yields an external …nance/GDP ratio of 2.22, while the tighter …nancial frictions yields 1.30. The …rst corresponds well to a typical top quintile country (e.g., Belgium), while the latter is in between the …rst and second quintiles, roughly Spain.
Numerical Examples
All of the values come directly out of the model except for output and sectoral productivity, A s , which we calculate as typically measured in the data. Output is measured at constant ("international", i.e., …rst-best) prices, while sectoral TFP is calculated as
The results for key variables are shown in The …rst row shows the particular value of chosen, which is the only parameter that is Finally, we note the e¤ect on wages, capital and output. Wages fall by 17 percent, or somewhat more than sectoral TFPs. The lower wages are an additional force leading to more …rms in the low-scale, non-tradable sector. The drop in output is similarly 16 percent.
About half of this decline is driven by the fall in TFP, while the remaining half is driven by a decline in capital. Capital falls by 25 percent, and since its share is 1/3, it contributes about 8 percent to the output decline. 
A Testable Implication
The simulations con…rm the intuition that …nancial frictions are relatively more harmful to TFP in the high entry cost, large-scale sectors. A surprising result, however, is the e¤ect of …nancial frictions on average scale in equilibrium; tighter …nancial frictions lead to greater disparity in scale in between the high-and low-entry cost sectors. This is the result of the lower average wages. Given low wages, (very) small-scale entrepreneurship is more desirable because the opportunity costs (i.e., the income from being a worker) is lower. Conversely, those who have the means to …nance the large scale entry cost face high output prices and lower labor costs that lead to larger scale establishments.
While absolute scales of sectors are governed by absolute productivity levels, which presumably vary across countries, the prediction that the relative average scale of the tradable sector is decreasing with income (or …nancial frictions) is a testable implication. The results for these three comparisons are shown in Figure 3 , which plots the scale of tradables relative to non-tradables on the logarithmic vertical axis and output per worker on the horizontal axis. 27 The U.S. is in the lower right-hand corner, and has fairly similar values for all three measures of scale. Focusing on the triangles, we see that in Mexico the relative scale of tradables establishments is larger in Mexico than in the U.S. This is also true of establishments in Korea and Turkey vs. the U.S., which are plotted using the diamonds.
The slope between relative scale and external …nance in these data are comparable to that calculated in the numerical examples (roughly -18), but the slope for Mexico is much ‡atter than in the numerical examples.
The squares shows that in the poorer countries also have the relative scale of tradables enterprises is larger than in the U.S. that are more in line with the numerical examples, but the relationship is not as strong or systematic. In particular, relative scale is smaller in France and especially Britain, although their ratios of external …nance to GDP are lower than in the United States. In contrast, relative scale of tradables is larger in Germany, driven by automobile manufacturing enterprises, which are substantially larger in Germany (2803) than in the U.S. (162) and other countries.
Conclusions
The paper has developed an explicit theory linking countries levels of …nancial development to their relative productivity in the tradable sector, and the equilibrium relative price of tradables. Tradable productivity is more sensitive to …nancial frictions because tradables require entail large set-up costs that often require external …nancing. Moreover, we have shown that this mechanism is quantitatively important, potentially explaining three-quarters of the observed relationship between …nancial development and relative prices in the cross-country data. Through this channel, both productivity and capital accumulation are lowered by …nancial frictions, thus …nancial development becomes quantitatively important for income per capita. Finally, we have shown that the implied mechanism is consistent with the large di¤erences in average scale across sectors observed in poor countries. Thus, the analysis shows how emphasis on the size distribution of microtechnologies (…rms or establishments)
is informative about macroissues such as productivity, relative prices and capital accumulation.
